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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6007 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board1 by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, • 
• • IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
) 
Certification - C-6007 - 2 -
Included: All regularly scheduled seasonal and hourly employees in the 
following titles: Recreation Attendant, Department Aide, Life 
Guard, Medical Emergency Attendant, Maintenance Laborer, 
; Range Officer, Senior Graphic Illustrator, Senior Recreation 
Leader, Teacher Assistant, Cleaner, Bridge Attendant, Junior 
Administrative Assistant, Laborer, Maintenance Mechanic 1 and 
Secretary 1. 
Excluded: Employees in the titles of Assistant Games Manager, Facility 
Manager, Life Guard Captain, Life Guard Lieutenant, Principle 
Teacher and all other employees (specifically, but not limited to 
"ushers" at the County Center for Events, and Community Service 
Aides for Special Events at County Parks). 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
) • • ' • • ' • ' • • • " . ' . 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
'
 N either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 19,2011 
Albany, New York 
Ijl/ism*-
Jerome Lefko$itz, Chairman 
/ " " Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6011 
SETAUKET FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer.
 v 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act,. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the.above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All full-time and regularly working part-time EMT Basic, EMT 
Critical Care, EMT.Paramedic, Maintenance Mechanic II & III, 
Certification-C-6011 - 2 -
Automotive Mechanic II & III, Automotive Equipment Operator, 
Clerk Typist, Senior Clerk Typist, Emergency Services Dispatcher 
& II, Custodial Worker I, and Fire Protection Coordinator. 
Excluded: AH other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
r 
proposal or require the making of a concession. -
DATED: August 19, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowftz, Chafprfian 
sSQ^^J^-
Sheila S.Colef Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of . 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6045 
VILLAGE OF HOLLEY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act,
 ( . 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-6045 - 2 -
Included: Electric and Water Technician, MEO, Clerk/Treasurer, Deputy 
Clerk/Treasurer, Laborer and Electric Clerk. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other^terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an. agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 19, 2011 
Albany, New York 
i r J, 
Jerome LefkoWftz, Chairman 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
( ) : 
In the Matter of • , 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
NEW YORK STATE, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6056 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS UNION, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, • 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Police Benevolent Association of New York 
State, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
1
 During the processing of the-petition, the incumbent bargaining agent, New York State 
Law Enforcement Officers Union, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, advised that 
it disclaimed any interest in representing the unit and declined to further participate in 
the proceeding. 
Certification - C-6056 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Traffic and Park Officer, Park Patrol Officer, Park Patrol Officer 
(Spanish), Sergeant Park Patrol, Lieutenant Park Patrol, Captain 
Park Patrol, Environmental Conservation Officer, Environmental 
Conservation Officer Trainee I and II, Supervising Environmental 
Conservation Officer, Chief Environmental Conservation Officer, 
University Police Officer I, University Police Officer I (Spanish), 
University Police Officer II, University Police Investigator I and II, 
and Forest Ranger I, II and 111. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public-employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Police Benevolent Association of New York State, Inc.. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in .good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 19,2011 
Albany, New York 
IJ/uW^ 
Jerome Lefkc/witz, Chairman 
/ Sheila S. Cofe, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 815, ERIE 




COUNTY OF ERIE, CASE NO. U-28856 
Respondent, 
- and -
ERIE COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER CORPORATION, 
Intervenor. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL G. ORTIZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
JAECKLE FLEISCHMANN & MUGEL, LLP (SEAN P. BEITER AND 
ELISHA J. BURKART of counsel), for Respondent 
COLUCCI & GALLAHER, P.C. (GILLIAN D. BROWN AND PAUL G. 
JOYCE of counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the County of Erie (County) 
and cross-exceptions by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 815, Erie County Medical Center Corporation Unit 6700-09 
(CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the County 
violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
Case No. U-28856 2 
refused to execute memoranda of agreement negotiated and signed by CSEA and the 
Erie County Medical Center Corporation (ECMCC).1 In her decision, the ALJ concluded 
that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by refusing to execute the at-issue 
agreements based upon its legal obligations under Public Authorities Law §3629. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The County asserts in its exceptions that CSEA failed to present sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the County violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act by failing to 
execute the at-issue agreements. In addition, the County claims that the ALJ erred in 
finding a binding past practice that requires the County to execute negotiated 
agreements reached between ECMCC and CSEA. Finally, it contends that the ALJ 
made errors of law in concluding that Public Authorities Law §3629 requires the County 
to sign such agreements and by finding that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act 
by failing to do so. - \ 
CSEA and ECMCC support the ALJ's decision. CSEA, however, has filed a 
cross-exception to the ALJ's proposed remedial order. CSEA seeks an order requiring 
the County to pay interest at the maximum legal rate to the employees who have not 
received salary increases as the result of the improper practice. In addition, CSEA 
seeks an order requiring the County to cease and desist from refusing to execute future 
agreements reached between CSEA and ECMCC. The County opposes CSEA's cross-
exception. 
Following our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the ALJ's decision, as modified herein. 
1
 43 PERB H4529 (2010). 
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• FACTS 
During the hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and agreed to 
the admission of joint exhibits. The stipulated facts and evidence were supplemented 
by the testimony of three witnesses. 
CSEA and the County are parties to a collectively negotiated agreement, which 
expired on December 31, 2006, for a bargaining unit of certain County employees and 
employees working at the Erie County Medical Center (ECMC). 
"In 2003, ECMCC was created as a public benefit corporation to manage and 
operate the pre-existing ECMC heath care network that included; ECMC, a public 
hospital owned and operated by the County; the Erie County Home and several clinics 
in the County.2 Prior to the creation of ECMCC, ECMC engaged in direct negotiations 
with employee organizations representing employees at the medical center, without 
County participation, resulting in memoranda of agreements modifying the terms and 
conditions of employment of medical center employees. Most of the agreements were 
also signed by a representative of the County Office of Labor Relations (OLR). During 
the same period, however, OLR signed memoranda of agreement with employee 
organizations regarding medical center employees without ECMC as a signatory.3 
Following ECMCC's creation, ECMCC Vice President of Human Resources 
Kathleen O'Hara (O'Hara) routinely negotiated memoranda of agreement with employee 
organizations that changed the terms and conditions of employment for medical center 
employees, including providing for upgrades. The County had no involvement in these 
2
 Pub Auth Law §§3626.1, 2, 3 and 4. 
3
 Joint Exhibit 5. 
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negotiations except as a signatory to most of the agreements. From March 2004 
through March 2008, 20 memoranda of agreements were reached directly between 
ECMCC and CSEA, and were signed by OLR. Two other agreements in 2006, however, 
did not conform to this pattern. An agreement to upgrade the ECMCC Director of 
Imaging was signed only by ECMCC and CSEA and another agreement regarding out-
of-title audits at the medical center was signed only, by OLR and CSEA.4 
Two agreements finalized in March 2008 included upgrades for various ECMCC 
titles in exchange for reductions in their paid lunch period to one-half hour and the 
elimination of a paid holiday. ECMCC submitted the March 2008 agreements to OLR 
Commissioner Christopher M. Putrino (Putrino), who signed them on behalf of the 
County. 
, In April 2008, Erie County, ECMCC and CSEA commenced unit-wide 
negotiations for a successor collectively negotiated agreement. The parties exchanged 
negotiation proposals calling for a general wage increase for the entire bargaining unit. 
There were, however, no discussions or proposals for upgrades of ECMCC titles. Other 
proposals called for unit-wide changes in summer work hours, employee lunch periods 
and paid holidays. The County proposed that the paid one-hour lunch period be ) 
replaced by an unpaid half-hour lunch period arid that two paid holidays be eliminated. 
During the course of the unit-wide negotiations, ECMCC and CSEA continued their 
direct negotiations without the County's participation, which resulted in numerous 
ECMCC-CSEA memoranda of agreement. In July and August 2008, Putrino signed all of 
the ECMCC-CSEA agreements including some that upgraded ECMCC titles in exchange 
4
 Joint Exhibit 5. 
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for reductions in the paid lunch period and eliminated a paid holiday for the at-issue 
employees. Putrino testified that he signed these agreements reluctantly because the 
terms related to pending County unit-wide proposals. There is no evidence, however, 
that he advised ECMCC or CSEA that the County would not execute subsequent 
agreements that were negotiated directly between ECMCC and CSEA. 
In October 2008, ECMCC and CSEA signed approximately 20 additional 
memoranda of agreements to upgrade ECMCC laboratory and pharmacy titles. Under 
the agreements for the laboratory titles, CSEA agreed to waive the contractual right to 
summer hours' and agreed to a reduction in the paid lunch period under the expired 
collectively negotiated agreement. In addition, many of the agreements required the at-
issue laboratory employees to work Election Day without additional compensation. The 
agreement for the pharmacists' upgrades included a waiver of any wage increases that 
may be negotiated for calendar years 2007 and 2008. 
i' • . 
Following ratification of the agreements by the affected employees, the 
agreements were sent to Putrino for his signature. However, after consulting with the 
County Executive, the County Attorney and the County Commissioner of Personnel, 
Putrino declined to sign the agreements and returned them to ECMCC. 
In a November 5, 2008 e-mail to ECMCC Vice President of Human Resources 
O'Hara, Putrino explained the rationale for the County's actions: 
As you know, Erie County and ECMC are in formal 
negotiations with CSEA for a successor collective bargaining 
agreement. I believe the title-by-title upgrade approach 
undermines and weakens our bargaining position with the 
CSEA unit as a whole. I realize ECMC is experiencing a 
staff shortage and that the title-by-title upgrades would give 
ECMC a quick-fix to this need, however, I believe Erie 
Case No. U-28856 6 
County must protect its bargaining position strengths as full-
scale negotiations continue.5 
During the hearing, Putrino supplemented the County's explanation. According to 
Putrino, executing the agreements would have weakened the County's negotiation 
position because the approximate 80 employees affected by the memoranda of 
agreements would be less likely to vote to ratify a negotiated unit-wide successor 
agreement. 
It is not disputed that the October 2008 memoranda of agreement have not been 
implemented and that the salary increases resulting, from the upgrades in the ECMCC 
titles would be paid from ECMCC's budget and not from the County's general budget. 
However, implementation of reallocation or modification of ECMCC job titles is subject 
to approval by the County Department of Civil Service. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with the County's exception asserting that CSEA failed to meet its 
burden of proof demonstrating that the County violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act. 
Although CSEA did not prove its allegation that the decision by Putrino not to 
execute the ECMCC-CSEA memoranda of agreement emanated from a directive from 
the County Executive, proof of such an order is unnecessary to demonstrate that the 
County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. The record establishes that Putrino, as the 
County's chief negotiator, is vested with the responsibility to execute negotiated 
agreements consistent with the County's legal obligations. Furthermore, whether the 
County is obligated to execute the agreements negotiated directly between ECMCC and 
5
 Joint Exhibit 8. 
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CSEA, without County participation, is a legal, rather than a factual issue, under the 
Public Authorities Law and the Act. Therefore, we deny the County's first exception. 
Contrary to the County's second exception, the ALJ did not conclude that there 
was a binding past practice between ECMCC and the County. Instead, the portion of 
the sentence quoted by the County from the ALJ's decision6 reveals that the ALJ 
utilized the history of the relationship between the County and ECMC, and later 
ECMCC, regarding negotiated agreements as an interpretive tool in construing Public 
Authorities Law §3629. 
Extrinsic aids, such as the historical background of a law, may be employed 
when seeking to determine the Legislature's intent with respect to an ambiguous 
statute.7 In the present case, however, we conclude that the record evidence regarding 
the history of negotiated agreements involving medical center terms and conditions of 
employment cannot be relied upon in interpreting Public Authorities Law §3629. 
The primary source of that history is a single joint exhibit in the record identifying 
the subject matter, the finalization date and the signatories to memoranda of agreement 
dating back to 1982, well before the creation of ECMCC. The joint exhibit reveals an 
inconsistent pattern regarding the signatories to the agreements. Some are signed by 
ECMCC, the County and CSEA, while others are executed only by the County and 
CSEA or only by ECMCC and CSEA. Furthermore, there is nothing in the legislative 
6
 The fragment quoted by the County is contained in the following sentence from the 
ALJ's decision: "Even more apparent is the fact that the agency language of §3629.2 of 
the Public Authorities Law reflects the existence of the bargaining accommodation the 
parties have developed and acceded to over the years." Supra note 1, 43 PERB TJ4529 
at 4625. 
7
 McKinney's Statutes §§122, 124. ^ 
Case No. U-28856 8 
history of Article 10-C, Title 6 of the Public Authorities Law,8 which created ECMCC, 
indicating that the Legislature was cognizant of any pattern and practice regarding the 
negotiations and signing of such agreements when the law was enacted. Therefore, we 
modify the ALJ's decision accordingly. 
Next, we turn to the County's contention that the ALJ misinterpreted Public 
Authorities Law §3629.2 and erred in concluding that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act by failing to execute the memoranda of agreements delivered to the County in 
October 2008. * •' 
The best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of a statute.9 When 
statutory language is unambiguous, it alone is determinative, and an interpretation of a 
statute must give effect to the plain meaning of the terms used.10 As the ALJ correctly 
recognized, however, a well-established principle of statutory construction requires that 
the provisions of a statute be construed together, and, if possible, all parts of the statute 
be harmonized with each other and the general intent of the statute.11 
The fundamental legal dispute between the parties in this matter stems from the 
potentially conflicting provisions contained in Public Authorities Law §§3629 and 3630 
8
 Pub Auth Law §§3625-3646. 
9
 Webster Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 75 NY2d 619, 23 PERB 
117013 (1990); Brooklyn Excelsior Charter Sch and Buffalo United Charter Sch, 44 
PERB 1J3001 (2011). 
™ Charter Development Co v City of Buffalo, 6 NY3d 578 (2006). 
11
 See, Friedman v Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 9 NY3d 105 (2007); People v 
Mobil Oil Corp, 48 NY2d 192 (1979); McKinney's Statutes §98. 
Case No. U-28856 
with respect to the powers and responsibilities of the County and ECMCC under the 
Act.12 
12 Sections 3629.2, 3, and 5 of the Public Authorities Law state: 
2. The employees of [ECMCC] shall, for all purposes of article fourteen of 
the civil service law, be deemed to be employees of the county of Erie and 
shall be employed within the current county of Erie bargaining unit 
designation. The county office of labor relations shall, for all purposes of 
article fourteen of the civil service law, act as agent for [ECMCC] and 
shall, with respect to [ECMCC], have all the powers and duties provided 
under article twenty-four of the executive law. Those persons who become 
employees of [ECMCC] pursuant to subdivision one of this section or who 
enter into the service of [ECMCC] following the effective date of the 
transfer shall retain their current bargaining unit designations. [ECMCC] 
and the county shall recognize the existing certified or recognized 
employee organizations for county employees as the exclusive collective 
bargaining representatives for such employees. 
Titles within collective bargaining units in existence prior to the transfer of 
operations to [ECMCC] shall remain in those units and shall not be altered 
by the public employment relations board without the consent of 
[ECMCC], the county, and the recognized or certified representatives of 
the negotiating units involved. New titles created after the date of the 
transfer of operations to [ECMCC] shall be placed in the appropriate unit 
of county employees consistent with the provisions of article fourteen of 
the civil service law. 
3. [ECMCC] shall be bound by all collective bargaining agreements 
between the county of Erie and such collective bargaining representatives 
in effect as of the date of transfer of operations to [ECMCC] and any 
successor agreements between such parties. 
5. Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to affect: 
(a) the rights of employees pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement; 
(b) the bargaining relationship between the executive branch of 
the county and an employee organization; or 
(c) existing law with respect to an application. 
Public Authorities Law §§3630.21 and 27, which grant ECMCC certain general powers, 
as limited by Article 10-C, Title 6 of the Public Authorities Law, state: 
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ECMCC was created as a corporate body in 2003 to manage and operate the 
pre-existing ECMC heath care network.13 The purpose for creating ECMCC was to 
ensure that health care services would be provided to the residents of the State of New 
York and the County of Erie, including those without the financial means to pay for such 
services.14 In Public Authorities Law §3626.5, the Legislature declared that: 
The needs of the residents of the state of New York and of 
the county of Erie can best be served by the operation of the 
Erie County Medical Center healthcare network through a 
public benefit corporation having the legal, financial, and 
managerial flexibility to take full advantage of opportunities 
and challenges presented by the evolving heath care 
environment. 
In their respective briefs, ECMCC-and CSEA contend that ECMCC and the 
County do not constitute a joint employer for purposes of the Act. However, in Brooklyn 
Excelsior Charter School and Buffalo United Charter School?6 we concluded that Public 
Authorities Law §3629 creates a statutory joint employer relationship between the 
County and ECMCC. Similarly, an ALJ in County of Erie and Erie County Medical 
21. to appoint such officers, employees, and agents as [ECMCC] may 
require for the performance of its duties and to fix and determine their 
qualifications, duties, and compensation, subject to the provisions of the 
civil service law and any applicable collective bargaining agreement, and 
to retain or employ counsel, auditors, engineers, and private consultants 
on a contract basis or otherwise for rendering professional, management, 
or technical services and advice; 
27. to make, adopt, amend, enforce, and repeal rules for its governance 
and internal management and personnel practices, subject to article 
fourteen of the civil service law, where applicable. 
13
 Pub Auth Law §§3626.1, 2, 3 and 4. 
14
 Pub Auth Law §3625.6. 
15
 Supra, note 8. 
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Center Corporation™ reached a similar legal conclusion citing the shared responsibilities 
and control by the County and ECMCC over the terms and conditions of employment of 
the at-issue unit employees in that case. The County and ECMCC did not file 
exceptions to that portion of the ALJ's decision, and we, therefore, concluded that they 
had waived a challenge to her joint employer determination under our Rules of 
Procedure.17 
Read together, the terms of Public Authorities Law §§3629 and 3630 
demonstrate a clear legislative intent to create a statutory joint employment relationship 
between the County and ECMCC, but with unique characteristics distinct from those of 
other joint employers designated under the Act. 
When the facilities and operations of the ECMC health care network were 
transferred from the County to ECMCC in January 2004, County medical center 
employees became ECMCC employees and are deemed public employees for all 
purposes.18 Nevertheless, as a matter of law, ECMCC employees are also deemed 
County employees for purposes of the Act, remain within the applicable bargaining unit 
16
 42 PERB 1J4511 (2009), a/Fd, 43 PERB 113008(2010). 
17
 Supra, note 16, 43 PERB 1J3008 at 3027, n: 2. Furthermore, in an earlier decision, 
we found that both the County and ECMCC violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act when 
ECMCC unilaterally implemented drug and alcohol testing and criminal background 
checks on County employees transferring into ECMCC or returning from being laid-off. 
County of Erie and Erie County Medical Center Corp, 39 PERB fl3036 (2006), 
confirmed Erie County Medical Center Corp v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 48 
AD3d 1094, 41 PERB 1J7002 (4th Dept 2008). 
18
 Pub Auth Law §3629.1. See also, County of Erie and Erie County Medical Center 
Corp, 39 PERBH3036 (2006), confirmed sub nom., Erie County Medical Center Corp v 
New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 48 AD3d 1094, 41 PERB U7002 (4th Dept 2008). 
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of County employees, and the bargaining relationships between the County and the 
applicable employee organizations remain unaffected.19 
Both the County and ECMCC are required to recognize the existing certified and 
recognized employee organizations and this Board is prohibited from altering the 
composition of those units without the consent of the County, ECMCC and the 
applicable employee organization.20 These Public Authorities Law provisions are at 
sharp variance with our well-established precedent under the Act that a separate 
bargaining unit is the most appropriate for employees of a joint employer.21 
To compound the complexity of the legislatively created County-ECMCC 
relationship, ECMCC is bound by the terms of existing collectively'negotiated 
agreements as well as the terms of any successor agreements negotiated by the 
County with the certified or recognized employee organization.22 At the same time, 
ECMCC is granted certain general powers, as limited by Article 10-C, Title 6 of the 
Public Authorities Law, to appoint employees, determine employee duties, set 
compensation*and create, amend, enforce and repeal managerial and personnel 
practices subject to the applicable provisions of the Act.23 
19
 Pub Auth Law §§3629.2 and 5(b). 
20
 See, Pub Auth Law §3629.2. 
21
 County of Ulster and Ulster County Sheriff, 3 PERB fl3032 (1970) confirmed, County 
of Ulster and Ulster County Sheriff Office v CSEA, 64 Misc2d 799, 3 PERB ^7013 
(Supreme Court Albany County 1970), modified, 37 AD2d 437, 4 PERB 1J7015 (3d Dept 
1971); County of Putnam, 33 PERB 1J3001 (2000). 
22
 Pub Auth Law §3629.3. 
Pub Auth Law §3630.21 and 27. 
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In the present case, the ALJ concluded that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act by failing to execute the October 2008 ECMCC-CSEA agreements between 
ECMCC and CSEA based upon the County's legal obligations pursuant to §204.3 of the 
Act and the following sentence in Public Authorities Law §3629.2: 
The county office of labor relations shall, for all purposes 
of article fourteen of the civil service law, act as agent for 
[ECMCC] and shall, with respect to [ECMCC], have all the 
powers and duties provided under article twenty-four of the 
executive law. . 
This sentence explicitly mandates that, for purposes of the Act, the County OLR 
acts as the "agent for" ECMCC and OLR is granted the same "powers and duties" of the 
Governor's Office of Employee Relations (GOER) under Executive Law, Article 24. 
Unlike GOER's permissive responsibilities for assisting the Governor under Executive 
Law §653, however, OLR's agency responsibilities for ECMCC in conducting collective 
negotiations and in executing agreements is mandatory. "Therefore, we must modify the 
ALJ's decision finding that the OLR-ECMCC relationship is equivalent to the Govemor-
GOER relationship under the Executive Law. 
In harmonizing the provisions of Public Authorities Law §§3629 and 3630 we 
reiterate that the County and ECMCC are a joint employer and we conclude that OLR is 
a common agent for both components of the joint employer for purposes of the Act. 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, however, it is not necessary for us to 
resolve the core statutory issue raised in the County's exceptions: whether OLR, as 
ECMCC's statutory agent, has a legal obligation to sign on behalf of the County all 
negotiated agreements reached directly between ECMCC and CSEA. 
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We conclude that §209-a.1 (d) of the Act was violated when OLR failed to sign 
the October 2008 agreements because the County had previously acquiesced in 
ECMCC's conducting separate direct negotiations with CSEA resulting in memoranda of 
agreement. As a general matter, each component of a joint employer has. an obligation 
to notify the other when engaging in direct negotiations with an employee organization. 
The evidence in the present case, however, reveals that the County had actual 
knowledge of the direct ECMCC-CSEA negotiations since the creation of ECMCC. 
Those negotiations resulted in the County executing multiple agreements that included 
upgrades for specific titles at ECMCC. For example, OLR Commissioner Putrino 
executed agreements in March, July and August 2008 that had been negotiated directly 
between ECMCC and CSEA. Although Putrino testified of his purported reluctance to 
sign the July and August 2008 agreements, it is not disputed that he did not notify 
ECMCC and CSEA that OLR would no longer execute similar future agreements on 
behalf of the County. Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we 
conclude that the County was obligated to inform ECMCC and CSEA of its intent to 
refrain from signing future agreements resulting from their direct negotiations. The 
County's failure to provide such notification created a reasonable belief that ECMCC 
had the authority to continue to engage in binding direct negotiations with CSEA on 
behalf of the joint employer under the Act. "[W]hen there is a joint employer relationship 
and one of the joint employers apparently cloaks the other joint employer to act on his 
behalf in negotiations," the refusal of either component of the joint employer to execute 
the agreement memorializing the negotiated terms and conditions violates §209-a.1(d) 
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of the Act.24 Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's decision finding a violation of §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act, as modified. 
In reaching our decision today, we are fully cognizant that our interpretation of 
the Public Authorities Law is not subject to judicial deference because statutory 
construction is a function of the courts.25 Indeed, a plenary action might be the most 
appropriate venue for resolving future disputes between the County and ECMCC over 
their unique statutory joint employment relationship under Public Authorities Law 
§§3629 and 3630. In fact, the County's financial obligations to ECMCC under Public 
Authorities Law §3632 were previously resolved only through extensive litigation by and 
between those parties in Erie County Supreme Court.26 
CSEA's Cross-Exception 
Pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act, PERB has broad remedial authority to order 
make-whole relief including ordering a party to cease and desist from engaging in an 
improper practice, and to order such affirmative relief, including back wages, which will 
effectuate the policies of the Act. Following a careful review of the record, we grant 
CSEA's cross-exception, in part, and modify the ALJ's proposed remedial order to-
mandate that the County refrain from interfering with ECMCC offering a make-whole 
24
 William B. Martin, Sheriff of Ulster County, 6 PERB P084 at 3136 (1973) enforced, 
New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd v Martin, 78 Misc2d,1072, 7 PERB 1J7014 (Supreme 
Court Albany County 1974). 
25
 Newark Valley Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Employ Rel Bd, 83 NY2d 315, 27 
PERB 1T7002 (1994). 
26
 Erie County Medical Center Corp v County of Erie, New York, Index No. 12005-1853 
(Supreme Court Erie County 2005), affd, 41 AD3d 1244 (4th Dept 2007). 
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remedy including back wages and benefits, along with interest at the maximum legal 
rate, to all ECMCC employees adversely impacted by the improper practice.27 
In addition, we modify the ALJ's remedial order to require that the notice be 
posted at all physical and electronic locations customarily used to post notices to unit 
employees.28 
However, we deny CSEA's request for an order requiring the County to cease 
and desist from refusing to execute future agreements reached between CSEA and 
ECMCC because such an order would be inappropriate under the facts and 
circumstances of the present case. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's decision, as modified. ^ 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Forthwith execute the memoranda of agreement proffered in October 2008; 
2. Refrain from interfering with ECMCC offering a make-whole remedy, including 
back wages and benefits, along with interest at the maximum legal rate, to all 
ECMCC employees adversely affected by the County's improper practice 
based upon the County's failure to execute the October 2008 memoranda of 
agreement between ECMCC and CSEA; 
27
 Ordinarily, we would have found a violation against the County and ECMCC as a joint 
employer, and issued a remedial order against that joint employer. See, County of Erie 
and Erie County Medical Center Corp, supra, note 17. However, CSEA filed its charge 
against the County and not the joint employer. Therefore, our remedial order is directed 
at the County for violating the Act. See, William B.. Martin, Sheriff of Ulster County, 
supra, note 24. We note that consistent with the parties' stipulation before the ALJ, the 
implementation of the upgrades of the ECMCC job titles remain subject to approval by 
the County Department of Civil Service. See also, Evans v Newman, 74 AD2d 240, 12 
PERB fl7022 (3d Dept 1979), affd, 49 NY2d 904, 13 PERB 1J7004 (1980). 
NYCTA, 43 PERB |f3038 (2010). 
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3. Sign and post the attached notice in all physical and electronic locations 
normally used for written communications to CSEA-represented employees at 
ECMCC. 
DATED: August 19, 2011 
Albany, New York 
yJ/XQftsC^ 
JS a -
irpers Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairperson 
/ • Sheila S. Cole, Member 
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NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Erie in the unit represented by 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Local 815, Erie County Medical Center Corporation Unit 6700-09 that the County 
of Erie shall: 
1. Execute the ECMCC-CSEA memoranda of agreement proffered in 
October 2008; 
2. Not interfere with ECMCC offering a make-whole remedy, including back 
wages and benefits, along with interest at the maximum legal rate, to all 
ECMCC employees adversely affected by the County's improper practice 
based upon the County's failure to execute the October 2008 memoranda of 
agreement between ECMCC and CSEA. 
Dated . . . . By . . . 
on behalf of County of Erie
 r 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ORANGE and SHERIFF OF ORANGE 
COUNTY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-28693 
ORANGE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
ORANGE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-28738 
COUNTY OF ORANGE and SHERIFF OF ORANGE 
COUNTY, 
Respondent. 
LAMB AND BARNOSKY, LLP (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN of counsel), for 
County of Orange and Sheriff of Orange County 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Orange County Deputy Sheriffs Police 
Benevolent Association 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by the Orange County Deputy 
Sheriffs Police Benevolent Association, Inc., (PBA) and cross-exceptions by the County 
of Orange and Orange County Sheriff (Joint Employer) to a decision of an Administrative 
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Law Judge (ALJ).1 In Case No. U-28693, the Joint Employer alleges that PBA violated 
§209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it sought interest 
arbitration of proposals that are nonarbitrable pursuant to §209.4(g) of the Act. In Case 
No. U-28738, PBA alleges that the Joint Employer violated §209.a-1(d) of the Act when it 
sought interest arbitration of proposals that are nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
On a stipulated record, the ALJ held that PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by 
submitting the following demands to interest arbitration because they are not directly 
related to compensation as required by §209.4(g) of the Act: PBA proposal #2, sick 
leave; proposal #4, compensatory time to the extent it deals with the conversion of 
accumulated leave; PBA proposal #7, holidays, PBA proposal #8, vacation; and PBA 
proposal #9, personal leave. In addition, the ALJ found that the Joint Employer violated 
the Act by submitting its proposal #9, leave without pay to interest arbitration because it 
is also not directly related to compensation. The ALJ determined that PBA did not 
violate the Act when it submitted PBA proposal #1, flex time to interest arbitration and 
, the Joint Employer did not violate the Act when it submitted its proposal #8, excused 
absences to interest arbitration. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, PBA contends that the ALJ erred in finding its sick leave, 
compensatory time, holidays, vacation and personal leave proposals are nonarbitrable. 
In addition, PBA excepts to the ALJ's finding that the County's excused absence 
proposal is arbitrable. The Joint Employer supports the ALJ's conclusion that PBA's 
sick leave, compensatory time, holidays, vacation and personal leave proposals are 
1
 43 PERB 1J4511 (2010). 
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nonarbitrable. The Joint Employer, however, excepts to the ALJ's finding that PBA's 
flex time demand is arbitrable and to her determination that the Joint Employer's leave 
without pay proposal is nonarbitrable. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse, in part, and affirm, in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
PBA and the Joint Employer are parties to a collective bargaining agreement, 
which expired on December 31, 2006. After the parties failed to reach agreement on 
terms for a successor agreement, PBA filed a petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration. The Joint Employer filed a response to the petition and an improper practice 
charge, Case No. U-28693, which alleges that PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by 
submitting to interest arbitration various proposals including proposals concerning flex 
time, sick leave, compensatory time, holidays, vacation, and personal leave. Shortly 
thereafter, PBA filed an improper practice charge, Case No. U-28738, which alleges 
that the Joint Employer violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it submitted to interest 
arbitration certain demands including the proposals regarding excused absence and 
leave without pay. The charges were consolidated by the ALJ and determined based 
upon a stipulated record in lieu of a hearing. 
The specific terms of the at-issue proposals before us are set forth in the 
appendix to this decision. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with PBA's exceptions to the ALJ's finding that PBA's proposals on 
sick leave, compensatory time, holidays, vacation and personal leave are nonarbitrable 
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pursuant to §209.4(g) of the Act. 
Section 209.4(g) of the Act states, in relevant part: 
With regard to any organized unit of deputy sheriffs...the 
provisions of this section shall only apply to the terms of 
collective bargaining agreements directly relating to 
compensation, including, but not limited to, salary, stipends, 
location pay, insurance, medical and hospitalization benefits; 
and shall not apply to non-compensatory issues including, 
but not limited to, job security, disciplinary procedures and 
actions, deployment or scheduling, or issues "relating to 
eligibility for overtime compensation which shall be governed 
by other provisions proscribed2 [sic] by law. 
In New York State Police Investigators Association (hereinafter, State Police),2 
the Board interpreted the subject matter exclusions to interest arbitration for impasses 
involving members of the State Police set forth in former §209.4(e) of the Act. The 
interpretation of former §209.4(e) of the Act in State Police is relevant in determining 
the exceptions and cross-exceptions in the present cases because the arbitrable and 
nonarbitrable subjects in that former provision are identical to those set forth in 
§209.4(g)oftheAct4 
2
 Should be "prescribed". , v 
3
 New York State Police Investigators Assn, 30 PERB1J3013 (1997), confirmed sub 
nom., New York State Police Investigators Assn v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 30 
PERB U7011 (Supreme Court Albany County 1997). 
4
 Putnam County Sheriff's Dept PBA, Inc., 38 PERB 1J3013 (2005); Ulster County 
Deputy Sheriffs PBA, Inc., 38 PERB 1J3033 (2005). In 2001 and 2002, the Legislature 
amended §209.4(e) of the Act to modify the subject matter exclusions for impasses 
involving members of the State Police. L 2001, c 587, L 2002, c 232. See, Town of 
Wallkill, 42 PERB 1J3017 (2009), pet dismissed, 43 PERB 1J7005 (Supreme.Court 
Albany County 2010). Section 209.4(e) of the Act currently excludes from interest 
arbitration "issues relating to disciplinary procedures and investigations or eligibility and 
assignment to details and positions, which shall be governed by other provisions < 
prescribed by law." 
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As part of the Board's analysis in State Police, it examined the Legislature's use 
of the term "compensation" in other provisions/of the Act, including §209.5(d)(ii), 
regarding interest arbitration for certain transit workers, which states: 
the overall compensation paid to the employees involved in 
the impasse proceeding, including direct wage 
compensation, overtime and premium pay, vacations, 
holidays and other excused time, insurance, pensions, 
medical and hospitalization benefits, food and apparel 
furnished, and all other benefits received; 
In interpreting and applying the statutory phrase "directly relating to compensation" in 
former §209.4(e), the Board emphasized the importance of the non-exclusive examples 
of arbitrable subjects "directly relating to compensation" listed by the Legislature: 
"salary, stipends, location pay, insurance, medical and hospitalization benefits." In 
addition, based upon the Legislature's use of the limiting term "directly", the Board 
concluded that the phrase "directly relating to compensation" is one which makes a 
proposal arbitrable according to the degree of the relationship between the proposal 
and compensation.5 Furthermore, the Board set forth the following test for arbitrability: 
The degree of a demand's relationship to compensation is 
measured by the characteristic of the demand. If the sole, ' 
predominant or primary characteristic of the demand is 
compensation, then it is arbitrable because the demand to 
that extent directly relates to compensation. A demand has 
compensation as its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic only when it seeks to effect some change in 
amount or level of compensation by either payment from the 
State to or on behalf of an employee or the modification of 
an employee's financial obligation arising from the • 
5
 Supra, note 3, 30 PERB 1J3013 at 3028. See also, County of Suffolk and Suffolk 
County Sheriff, 40 PERB 113022 (2007) where we found the use of the term 'directly' in 
§209.4(g) of the Act demonstrated a legislative intent to narrow the range of arbitrable 
proposals involving deputy sheriffs to those proposals where the sole, predominant or 
primary characteristic seeks a modification in the amount or level of compensation. 
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employment relationship (e.g., a change in an insurance co-
payment).6 [Emphasis in original] 
Applying this test, the Board affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that the employee 
organization's various demands for time-off from work without loss of pay were not 
arbitrable because they were not directly related to compensation.7 In reaching that 
conclusion, the Board found that the sole predominant characteristic of each leave 
proposal was hours of work noting that the demands sought only the maintenance of 
the level of compensation by disallowing a wage reduction based upon an employee's 
absence. 
In contrast, the Board reversed the ALJ's findings with respect to the proposals 
for dependent education costs and funeral expenses when a unit member dies in the 
line of duty, concluding that those proposals were arbitrable because they were 
indistinguishable from the conditional insurance, medical and hospitalization benefits 
listed as arbitrable in the statute. 
On appeal, Supreme Court, Albany County adopted the Board's test for 
arbitrability and confirmed the conclusion that the leave proposals seeking time-off 
without a loss of pay were nonarbitrable and that the proposals for dependent education 
costs and funeral expenses were arbitrable. In the portion of the Court's decision 
confirming the nonarbitrability of the leave proposals, the Court stated that "these 
demands may eventually confer an economic benefit upon the employee; however, 
6
 Supra note 3, 30 PERB 1J3013 at 3028. 
7
 The at-issue leave proposals related only to the amount of holiday, meal period, sick 
leave, vacation and bereavement leave entitlement. Supra, note 3, 30 PERB ^3013 at 
3032-3033. 
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simply because they represent potential compensation does not mean that they are 
arbitrable because they do not directly relate to compensation."8 [Emphasis in original.] 
In Putnam County Sheriff's Department Police Benevolent Association9 
(hereinafter, County of Putnam), the Board held that proposals to increase the sick 
leave buyout provision of the parties' agreement and to create a monetary sick leave 
incentive program were nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act because they related 
only to future "potential" compensation and, therefore, the sole or predominant 
characteristic of the proposals was not compensation. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Board reiterated the State Police arbitrability test and then cited to the Court's dicta in 
State Police indicating that the potentiality of future compensation resulting from a 
proposal does not necessarily render it directly related to compensation. At the same 
time, the Board ruled in County of Putnam that proposals seeking retroactive payment 
of "wages, economic and other benefits" and health insurance benefits for current 
employees upon retirement were arbitrable under §209:4(g) of the Act.10 
In Sullivan County Patrolmen's Benevolent Association 11 (hereinafter, County of 
Sullivan), the Board found that various demands were nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of 
the Act. In that case, the Board concluded that a proposal seeking the conversion of 
8
 New York State Police Investigators Assn v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, supra, 
note 3, 30 PERB 1J7011, at 7020. 
9
 Supra, note 4. 
10
 In County of Putnam, supra, note 4, the Board also held that a demand regarding a 
procedure for the resolution of overtime disputes and clarification of the employees 
covered by a prior stipulation between the parties were nonarbitrable. 
11
 39 PERB H3034 (2006). 
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overtime compensation to compensatory time and a method of payment for 
accumulated compensatory time related to potential compensation and therefore is not 
directly related to compensation under County of Putnam. The Board also held in 
County of Sullivan that a proposal regarding the accumulation of and payment for 
holiday leave was not nonarbitrable under State Police because it was predominantly a 
demand for paid time off from work. Finally, the Board found in County of Sullivan that 
proposals to increase the rate of accumulation of vacation and sick leave and to permit 
the conversion of such unused leave to cash or be banked in a health insurance 
retirement account were predominantly proposals with respect to the accrual of leave 
time under County of Putnam. 
PBA concedes in its exceptions that the arbitrability test originally articulated in 
State Police is applicable to determining whether its proposals in the present case are 
arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. PBA contends, however, that the arbitrability of its 
proposals should not be analyzed based upon County of Putnam and County of Sullivan 
because those decisions misconstrued and misapplied the State Police arbitrability test, 
and the decisions are inconsistent with the purposes and policies of §209.4(g) of the 
Act. PBA argues, therefore, that County of Putnam and County of Sullivan should be 
reversed. PBA also urges partial reversal of State Police on the grounds that the finding 
of nonarbitrabiilty of the leave provisions in that case constituted a misapplication of the 
arbitrability test. 
In response to PBA's exceptions, the Joint Employer contends that the 
arbitrability of PBA's proposals should be examined based upon the decisions in County 
of Putnam and County of Sullivan, and that there is no reason for PERB to reverse 
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those decisions. 
It is well-settled that the doctrine of stare decisis is applicable to administrative 
agencies, as well as the courts.12 The purpose of stare decisis is "to promote efficiency 
and provide guidance and consistency in future cases by recognizing that legal 
questions, once settled, should not be reexamined every time they are presented."13 
We recognize, further, that the doctrine of stare decisis is particularly important for 
public sector labor relations because predictability and consistency are essential for 
assuring harmonious labor-management relations. At the same time, like the courts, 
PERB may correct erroneous interpretations of law by reversing prior precedent when 
to do so would effectuate the policies of the Act.14 
Following a careful review of the Act and our precedent, we reaffirm that the 
appropriate test for determining whether a particular demand is arbitrable under 
§209.4(g) of the Act is the one originally annunciated in State Police. Under that test, 
each proposal must be examined separately to discern whether its sole, predominant or 
primary characteristic is a modification in the amount or level of compensation. 
Consistent with State Police, in applying that test, we will compare a proposal with the 
subjects specifically identified by the Legislature as being arbitrable: "salary, stipends, 
12
 Charles A. Field Delivery Service, Inc. v Roberts, 66 NY2d 516 (1985). 
13
 People vBing, 76 NY2d 331, 338 (1990). 
14
 County of Orange, 14 PERB P060 (1981); Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 
PERB H3005 (2008), confirmed and mod, in part, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 PERB 1J7004 (3d 
Dept 2009), on remittitur, 42 PERB 1J3016 (2009); City of Cohoes, 31 PERB 1J3020 
(1998), confirmed sub nom., Uniformed Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562 v Cuevas, 
32 PERB 1J7026 (Supreme Court Albany County 1999), affd, 276 AD2d 184, 33 PERB 
1J7019 (3d Dept 2000) Iv denied, 96 NY2d 711 (2001). 
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location pay, insurance, medical and hospitalization benefits." In addition, we will 
compare the proposal with those subjects declared by the Legislature to be 
nonarbitrable: "job security, disciplinary procedures and actions, deployment or 
scheduling, or issues relating to eligibility for overtime compensation." 
Contrary to PBA's argument, the State Police decision correctly applied the 
arbitrability test by concluding that proposals limited to seeking an increase in the 
amount of accumulated leave without a wage reduction are not directly related to 
compensation. We, however, agree with PBA that the Board in County of Putnam 
misapplied the State Police test for arbitrability when it concluded that the two proposals 
that were limited to seeking supplemental compensation for the nonuse of sick leave 
were nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act because they related only to future 
"potential" compensation. In reaching its decision in County of Putnam, the Board 
overlooked the substantive differences between those proposals, which explicitly sought 
monetary compensation, and the proposals in State Police that sought only an increase 
in leave accumulation that would result in additional time off without a cumulative 
change in employee compensation. Furthermore, the County of Putnam decision 
misconstrued the meaning and significance of the dicta in the court's decision in State 
Police regarding "potential compensation." That dicta related only to the leave 
accumulation proposals that did not seek an increase in the level of compensation. 
Although the dependent education costs and funeral proposals in State Police offered 
only the "potential" for economic benefits, the court confirmed the Board's decision that 
both proposals were arbitrable. 
Indeed, by definition, all compensatory provisions of an agreement or an interest 
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arbitration award provide for only "potential" compensation including subjects such as 
salary, stipends and location pay, which are arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
There is nothing in §209.4(g) of the Act or the State Police test that requires a proposal 
to be directly related to actualized - as opposed to potential - compensation in order to 
be arbitrable. At the same time, a proposal primarily focused upon hours of work is 
nonarbitrable even though it may be indirectly related to compensation. 
We note that on the same day that County of Putnam was decided, the Board 
issued Ulster County Deputy Sheriff's Police Benevolent Association, Inc.,15 (County of 
Ulster) in which it held that a proposal for unlimited sick leave accumulation was 
nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act because the proposal sought to maintain unit 
member's level of compensation when absent from work. In reaching that particular 
legal conclusion, the Board relied upon State Police but not County of Putnam.™ 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse County of Putnam to the extent it held that 
a proposal limited to seeking a change in the aggregate amount or level of 
compensation received by unit members resulting from the nonuse of sick leave is 
nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act because it represents "potential" 
compensation. The primary characteristic of such a demand is the monetization of sick 
leave, a compensatory benefit not ordinarily available to public employees.17 Similarly, 
we reverse the Board's decision in County of Sullivan to the extent it relied upon County 
of Putnam to conclude that a proposal seeking to permit the conversion of overtime 
15
 38 PERB P033 (2005). 
16
 Supra, note 16, 38 PERB 1J3033, at 3115-3116; 
17
 See, GML §92. 
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compensation into compensatory leave and to permit the subsequent remonetization of 
that leave back into cash or to be applied to health insurance is nonarbitrable because it 
relates only to "potential" compensation. We conclude that both aspects of that type of 
demand, whether proposed by an employer or employee organization, directly relate to 
the amount of overtime compensation for unit members.18 
Partial reversal of County of Putnam and County of Sullivan is necessary to 
correct the Board's prior transformation of the judicial dicta in State Police about the 
potentiality of compensation into an administrative mantra to support the nonarbitrability 
of proposals directly related to compensation in contravention of the clear public policy 
dictates of §209.4(g) of the Act. 
However, we reaffirm the Board's holding in County of Sullivan that a unitary 
demand that includes leave accumulation and compensation to unit members for 
unused leave does not satisfy the arbitrability test under State Police. A demand that 
includes an inseparable component calling for an increase in leave accumulation cannot 
be characterized as being solely, predominantly or primarily related to increasing the 
level or amount of compensation under State Police. 
18
 The practical impact of the distinction drawn by the Legislature in §209.4(g) of the Act 
between arbitrable and nonarbitrable subjects might lead parties to choose to segregate 
arbitrable subjects from the nonarbitrable in their initial proposals or to sever them 
during the course of negotiations. While such an approach is not obligatory under 
§209.4(g) of the Act, it can help avoid unnecessary delays in the issuance of interest 
arbitration awards and fact-finding reports following an impasse. In contrast, the tactic of 
bundling together arbitrable and nonarbitable subjects into a single unitary demand, like 
a unitary demand that includes mandatory and nonmandatory subjects, assumes the 
high risk that the proposal will be treated as nonarbitrable. See, Town of Haverstraw, 11 
PERB TJ3109 (1978)(subsequent history omitted); Pearl River Union Free Sch D/sf,-11 
PERB 1J3085 (1978); Highland Falls PBA, Inc., 42 PERB 1J3020 (2009)(applying the 
unitary demand doctrine to mandatory and nonmandatory subjects). 
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In the present case, we conclude that PBA proposal #2, sick leave, PBA proposal 
#7, holidays, PBA proposal #8, vacation and PBA proposal #9, personal leave are 
arbitrable pursuant to §209.4(g) of the Act because each seeks a form of deferred 
compensation for unused accumulated leave that is ordinarily forfeited at the time of 
separation from service.19 Therefore, the proposals to permit the conversion of unused 
leave time to cash or to be applied to health insurance costs are directly related to 
modifying the amount or level of compensation a unit employee would be entitled to at 
the time of separation or retirement. 
We reach different conclusions regarding PBA proposal #4, compensatory time. 
This demand contains two distinct components: 1) a proposed increase in the amount of 
compensatory leave time that can be accumulated from year to year; and 2) the 
proposed conversion of unused leave time to cash or to be applied to health insurance 
costs. The ALJ ruled that these components are severable and that the first component 
is arbitrable but the latter is not under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
In its exceptions, PBA asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that the second 
part of the proposal is nonarbitrable and the Joint Employer has filed a cross-exception 
to the ALJ's conclusion that the first part is subject to interest arbitration.20 Based upon 
the holding in State Police, we grant the Joint Employer's cross-exception and reverse 
19
 See generally, Garrigan v Incorporated Vill of Malverne, 12 AD3d 400, (2d Dept 
2004); Rubinstein v Simpson, 109 AD2d 885 (2d 1985). 
20
 Neither party filed an exception to the ALJ's conclusion that the two components were 
severable. Therefore, that issue is waived under §213.2(b)(4) of the Rules of Procedure 
(Rules). See, Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB1J3008 (2007), confirmed, Town of 
Orangetown v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 PERB 1J7008 (Supreme Court 
Albany County 2007). 
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the ALJ with respect to the arbitrability of the first component, which is limited to the 
accumulation of leave. In addition, we grant PBA's exception with respect to the latter 
component because it seeks deferred compensation for unused accumulated leave 
ordinarily forfeited at the time of separation. 
We recognize that our ruling with respect to the arbitrability of the two parts of the 
proposal makes them subject to separate final negotiation impasse resolution 
procedures. This is an unavoidable consequence of the Legislature's public policy 
choice reflected in §209.4(g) of the Act to have impasses directly related to 
compensation resolved through compulsory interest arbitration while leaving other 
negotiability impasses subject to the Act's preexisting track, which includes fact-
finding.21 
PBA asserts in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in concluding that Joint 
Employer proposal #8, excused absence, is subject to interest arbitration. We agree 
with PBA, in part. The proposal would delete Article Ten of the parties' agreement, 
which contains three severable paragraphs. The primary or predominant characteristic 
of the first paragraph,of Article Ten is scheduling, a nonarbitrable subject under 
§209.4(g) of the Act. The second and third paragraphs of Article Ten, however, are 
directly related to compensation of unit members during the suspension of County 
operations. We, therefore, conclude that Joint Employer proposal #8 is arbitrable only 
to the extent it seeks to delete the two paragraphs in Article Ten that are directly related 
to compensation. 
We next turn to the Joint Employer's cross-exception challenging the ALJ's 
21
 See, State of New York, 43 PERB H3046 (2010). 
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finding that PBA proposal #1, flex time is arbitrable. This proposal seeks to delete 
Article Five of the parties' agreement, which includes provisions related to flex time, 
pass days and overtime. Pursuant to §209.4(g) of the Act, the amount of overtime 
compensation to be paid to eligible unit members is arbitrable,22 while scheduling and 
deployment are explicitly excluded from arbitration. Because the subject of this unitary 
proposal includes flex time and scheduling, it is nonarbitrable even though it may touch 
upon overtime. We, therefore, reverse the ALJ accordingly. 
Finally, we deny the Joint Employer's exception to the ALJ's conclusion that Joint 
Employer proposal #9, leave without pay is nonarbitrable. This proposal, which would 
require that an employee's unpaid leave of absence run simultaneously with leave 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act23 (FMLA), is nonarbitrable because its 
predominant characteristic is utilization of unpaid leave by unit employees. 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ's decision to the extent that she 
concluded that PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act when it submitted PBA proposal #2, 
sick leave, a portion of PBA proposal #4, compensatory time, PBA proposal #7, 
holidays, PBA proposal #8, vacation, PBA proposal #9, personal leave, and directed 
PBA to withdraw those proposals. We also grant PBA's exception with respect to Joint 
Employer proposal #8, excused absence, in part, and conclude that the Joint Employer 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act to the extent it seeks to delete paragraph one of Article 
Ten of the parties agreement and direct the Joint Employer to withdraw that portion of 
its proposal #8. Finally, we grant the Joint Employer's cross-exception with respect to 
22
 New York State Police Investigators Assn, supra, note 3. 
23
 29 USC §2612. 
Case Nos. U-28693 & U-28738 16 
PBA proposal #1, flex time and PBA proposal #4, with respect to the accumulation of 
leave, and conclude that PBA violated §209.a.2(b) of the Act by submitting those 
proposals to interest arbitration and hereby direct PBA to withdraw the proposals. 
DATED: August 19, 2011 
Albany, New York 
y Sheila S. Cole, Member 
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APPENDIX 
PBA Proposal 1 - Flex Time 
The proposal seeks to delete Article Five - Hours of Work, §11. Flex Time 
a. Subject to the conditions found'in this agreement, the Sheriff may 
assign an employee up to 11 hours flex time in a 28-day work period 
without overtime being incurred. Effective January 1, 2006, the 
number of flex hours shall become 8 hours in a 28-day work period. 
b. Absent consent of an employee, flex time may not be scheduled or 
assigned during an employee's approved leave time and pass days 
contiguous to vacation leave. 
c. If an employee works more than four hours of flex time on their regular 
pass day or chart day, the employee will be rescheduled for a new 
pass day within the 28-day work schedule selected by the employee 
subject to supervisory approval. If the new pass day cannot be 
scheduled within the current 28-day work schedule, it will be scheduled 
in the following 28-day schedule. 
d. There will be no "make work" when an employee is scheduled to work 
flex time. 
e. The entitlement to overtime for working more than 171 hours in a 28-
day work schedule period is calculated based on each 28-day work 
schedule period standing alone. If an employee is not scheduled to 
work all of his/her flex time in a 28-day schedule cycle, the 
unscheduled time is not carried over to the following 28-day schedule 
cycle. ; 
PBA Proposal 2 - Sick Leave 
Effective January 1, 2007, at employee's option upon separation or 
retirement, paid [sic] for all unused sick leave accumulation at the rate of 
pay in effect at the time, or can designate all or any portion to pay for 
health insurance, dental and optical cost, if any, not paid by the Employer, 
until all of the dollar amount is applied, for individual and/or eligible . 
dependent coverage. 
PBA Proposal 4 - Compensatory Time 
Increase existing amount of hours to be carried over from year to year as 
follows: 
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(+80 Hours) (N/C) 
1/1/07 1/1/08 
120 Hours 120 Hours 
Effective January 1, 2007, at the employee's option upon separation or 
retirement, paid [sic] for all unused accumulated compensatory time, at 
the rate of pay in effect at that time, or can designate all or any portion to 
pay for health insurance, dental and optical cost, if any, not paid by the 
Employer, until all of the dollar amount is applied, for individual and/or 
eligible dependent coverage. 
PBA Proposal 7 - Holidays 
Effective January 1, 2007, at employee's option upon separation or 
retirement, paid [sic] for all unused Holiday accumulation at the rate of pay 
in effect at that time, or can designate all or any portion to pay for health 
insurance, dental and optical cost, if any, not paid by the Employer, until 
all of the dollar amount is applied, for individual and/or eligible dependent 
coverage. 
PBA Proposal 8 - Vacation 
Effective July 1, 2007, at employee's option upon separation or retirement, 
paid [sic] for all unused Vacation accumulation up to forty-five (45) days, 
at the rate of pay in effect at that time, or can designate all or any portion 
to pay for health insurance, dental and optical cost, if any, not paid by the 
Employer, until all,of the dollar amount is applied, for individual and/or 
eligible dependent coverage. 
PBA Proposal 9 - Personal Leave 
Effective January 1, 2007, at employee's option and upon an employee's 
retirement, he/she shall be paid for all unused Personal Leave 
accumulation at the rate of pay in effect at that time, or can designate all 
or any portion to pay for health insurance, dental and optical cost, if any, 
not paid by the Employer, until all of the dollar amount is applied, for 
individual and/or eligible dependent coverage. 
Joint Employer Proposal 8 - Excused Absence 
The proposal seeks to delete Article Ten of the parties' agreement, which states: 
1. In the event that the County Executive or his designated 
representative(s) shall declare County operations suspended, 
employees who are scheduled to work need not report for work unless 
they have been designated essential. Employees who are at work at 
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the time of such declaration shall leave work unless they have been 
declared essential. 
2. An employee who reports for work, as scheduled, and does work prior 
to said County Executive's declaration, shall receive compensatory 
time equal to such actual hours worked on a "one for one" basis. 
3. Employees shall continue to be paid for the duration of the declared 
suspension of County operations without charge to paid leave 
accruals; except that employees on paid leave or otherwise absent at 
the time of said declaration shall continue on paid leave, and their paid 
leave accruals shall continue to be charged for the duration of such 
authorized leave or other absence. 
Joint Employer Proposal 9-Leave Without Pay 
The proposal seeks to amend Article 11(1) of the parties' agreement by adding 
the following sentence: 
Where eligible, leaves of absence will run simultaneously with FMLA leave. 
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This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Chemung County 
Sheriff's Association, Inc. (Association) and cross-exceptions by the County of 
Chemung and the Chemung County Sheriff (Joint Employer) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it sought interest arbitration of a 
nonarbitrable proposal under §209.4(g) of the Act.1 
On a stipulated record, the ALJ concluded that the Association violated §209-
a.2(b) of the Act by submitting to interest arbitration a demand for a General Municipal 
' Law (GML) §207-c hearing procedure and ordered the Association to withdraw that 
demand. 
1
 44 PERB H4564(2011). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that the Joint Employer's 
improper practice charge, amended charge, and second amended charge are timely 
under our Rules of Procedures (Rules) and precedent. In addition, the Association 
asserts that its GML §207-c hearing procedure proposal is a mandatory subject under 
the Act and is arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act because it is directly related to 
compensation. The Joint Employer generally supports the ALJ's decision, but contends 
that the hearing procedure proposal is both nonmandatory and nonarbitratable. 
The Joint Employer has filed a cross-exception asserting that the ALJ 
misconstrued its second amended charge and erred in failing to conclude that the 
Association's entire GML §207-c proposal constitutes a prohibited subject of arbitration 
under §209.4(g) of the Act. In response to the cross-exception, the Association asserts 
inter alia that the Joint Employer waived its right to challenge the arbitrability of the 
entire GML §207-c proposal. 
Following our careful review of the record, the exceptions and cross-exceptions, 
we reverse the decision of the ALJ. ' 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Following an impasse in negotiations limited to the Association's comprehensive 
GML §207-c proposal, the Association filed a petition for compulsory interest arbitration 
on February 23, 2009. The Association's GML §207-c proposal included multiple 
separate paragraphs with respect to distinct subjects including the application 
procedures for benefits, the Joint Employer's right in determining initial eligibility, 
directing medical examinations and treatment, assigning light duty assignments, and 
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terminating benefits. Section 11 of the GML §207-c proposal is entitled "Hearing 
Procedures," and states: 
Hearing requests under the provision of this procedure shall 
be conducted by a neutral Hearing Officer, from a list of four 
Hearing Officers mutually agreed upon by the parties. The 
names of the Hearing Officers will be placed on a list 
numbered 1-4. When a hearing is requested, the Employer 
will request the first Hearing Officer on the list. Each name 
will be moved to the bottom of the list after each hearing. 
The fees and expenses of the Hearing Officer shall be borne 
equally by the parties. The Claimant/Recipient may be 
represented by a designated representative and may 
subpoena witnesses. Each party shall be responsible for all 
fees and expenses incurred in their representation. Either 
party or the Hearing Officer may cause a transcript to be 
made. The Claimant/Recipient and the Employer agree to 
share equally the costs of the transcript. After the hearing, 
the Hearing Officer shall render a determination which shall 
be final and binding upon all parties. 
Any such decision of the Hearing Officer shall be reviewable 
only pursuant to the provisions of Article 78 of the Civil 
Practice Law and Rules. 
On March 10, 2009, the Joint Employer filed a charge alleging that the 
Association engaged in an improper practice by submitting a nonmandatory subject, the 
hearing procedure contained in §11 of the GML §207-c proposal, to interest arbitration. 
The following day, the Joint Employer filed its response to the Association's petition for 
compulsory interest arbitration under §205.5 of the Rules. Following an examination of 
the charge's allegations, the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) notified the Joint Employer that its pleading was deficient. The 
Joint Employer responded to the deficiency notice on March 26, 2009 by filing an 
amended charge adding the detail that it received the Association's petition on or about 
February 25, 2009. The Director assigned the case to an ALJ, the Association filed its 
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answer, which included a timeliness defense, and a pre-hearing conference was held. 
Thereafter, the Joint Employer sought leave to file a second amendment to 
allege "that the 207 procedure is a prohibited subject for interest arbitration," which was 
opposed by the Association on the basis that the proposed amendment would allege a 
new and different claim.2 In granting the Joint Employer's application, the ALJ stated: 
Specifically, the charge as originally filed alleged that the 
procedure is non-mandatory. The proposed second 
amendment.seeks to add that the procedure is also a 
prohibited subject. The request to amend is granted 
because the proposed amendment simply adds a second 
legal argument as to why the §207-c procedure is not a 
proper subject for interest arbitration. 
The. Joint Employer filed its second amended charge on April 17, 2009, which 
added the following new allegation: 
In addition, the 207 procedure is a prohibited subject for 
interest arbitration as Civil Service Law §209(4)(c)(vii)(g) 
clearly requires that only matters directly related to 
compensation are appropriate subjects for interest 
arbitration. 
i ) 
The Association then filed an amended answer responding to the new allegation, again 
asserting a timeliness defense. 
DISCUSSION 
The Original Charge and First Amended Charge 
We reject the Association's argument that the Joint Employer's original and first 
amended charge are untimely under §205.6(b) of the Rules because they were not filed 
"simultaneously" with the Joint Employer's response to the petition for interest 
2
 Joint Exhibits 9 and 10, 
3
 Joint Exhibit 14. 
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arbitration. The applicable timeframe for the filing of the charge is set forth in §205.6(b) 
of the Rules, which states that a charge "may not be filed after the date of the filing of 
the response" (emphasis added). In City of Elmira4 (Elmira), we stated: 
In relevant respect, §§205.5(a) and 205.6(b) of our Rules 
together require an improper practice charge raising a [sic] 
objection to the arbitrability of a demand to be filed at or 
before the time the response to the petition for interest 
arbitration is filed.5 
In Canton Police Association6 {Canton), we recently reaffirmed this interpretation and 
rejected a party's reliance upon an obvious misstatement regarding simultaneous filings 
contained in a footnote in South Nyack/Grand View Joint Police Administration Board 
(South Nyack).7 
In the present case, based upon the explicit terms of the applicable Rule and our 
decisions in Elmira and Canton, we reject the Association's contention that the charge 
and the first amended charge are untimely based upon the misstatement in South 
Nyack. 
Similarly, we reject the Association's attacks upon the processing and timeliness 
4
 25 PERB H3072(1992). 
5
 Supra, note 4, 25 PERB P072 at 3148. 
644PERB 1J3019 (2011). ' 
7
 35 PERB 1J3007 (2002). The footnote in South Nyack stated: 
Notwithstanding the Assistant Directors [sic] determination, 
§205.6(c) of our Rules requires that a petition for declaratory 
ruling may not be filed after the date of the filing of the 
response to the petition for interest arbitration. The Police 
Board's January 9, 2002 filing of the declaratory ruling 
petition on PERB's form was not, therefore, timely as it was 
not filed simultaneouslywith its response to the PBA's 
petition, (emphasis added) 35 PERB 1J3007 at 3015, n. 3. 
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of the first amended charge. During his initial review of a charge, pursuant to §204.2(a) 
of the Rules, the Director is responsible for conducting a facial examination of the 
pleading to determine whether the alleged facts state a violation of the Act as a matter 
of law, and whether the alleged violation occurred more than four months prior to the 
filing of the charge. Frequently, following the Director's initial review of a charge, a 
charging party is sent a deficiency notice that includes an opportunity for the charge to 
be withdrawn or amended. 
In Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority,8 we described the 
Director's practice with respect to deficient charges: 
As a matter of practice, the Director sends a notice to a 
charging party setting forth the reason(s) for the deficiency. 
The notice informs the charging party that it may either 
amend the charge by a certain date, withdraw the charge or 
stand by its initial pleading. In addition, the notice warns the 
charging party that if it fails to respond to the notice the 
charge will be deemed withdrawn and the matter will be 
closed. Although the Director sends the respondent a copy 
of the notice, along with a copy of the deficient charge, the 
respondent is not obligated to respond until such time as the 
charge is processed. 
In response to a deficiency notice, a charging party has a 
variety of options: it can voluntarily withdraw the charge; 
ignore the notice and have the charge be deemed withdrawn 
by the Director; amend the charge with the aim of correcting 
the deficiencies, and/or have the charge be subject to the 
Director's summary dismissal.9 
In the present case, after conducting his facial examination of the allegations of 
the original charge pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director notified the Joint 
B
 40 PERB H3023 (2007). 
9
 Supra, note 8, 40 PERB 1J3023 at 3095. 
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Employer that the pleading was deficient because it did not allege when the 
Association's petition for compulsory interest arbitration was received, an alleged fact 
necessary for the Director to determine whether the charge is timely on its face. The 
Director's notice granted the Joint Employer an opportunity to file an amendment to 
correct the deficiency by a certain date, which the Joint Employer did. 
Contrary to the Association's argument, the factual detail regarding when the 
Joint Employer received the petition for interest arbitration was not a fundamental defect 
requiring dismissal. Furthermore, the Director's act of permitting the Joint Employer to 
file an amendment with that detail was well within his discretion under §§204.1(d) and 
204.2(a) of the Rules because it was necessary in order for him to conduct a facial 
review of the timeliness of the charge. 
In addition, we are not persuaded by the Association's contention, premised 
upon dicta in United Federation of Teachers (Fearon)™ that the first amended charge 
does not relate back to the filing of the original charge for purposes of timeliness. 
Although the factual allegations of a charge may be superseded by an amended 
pleading, the timeliness of an amended charge is examined based upon the filing date 
of the original charge so long as the claims relate back to the original charge.11 In the 
present case/the first amended charge merely alleged the detail requested by the 
Director without adding a new or distinct claim. Therefore, we reject the Association's 
assertion that the first amended charge should have been dismissed as untimely. 
10
 34 PERB P031 (2001). 
11
 See, State of New York (Dept of Transportation), 23 PERB |[3005 (1990), confirmed 
sub nom., State of New York (Dept of Transportation), 174 AD2d 905, 24 PERB 1J7014 
(3d Dept 1991); Oyster Bay-East Norwich Cent Sch Dist, 23 PERB P031 (1-990). 
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Second Amended Charge 
We reach a different conclusion regarding the Association's exception asserting 
that the second amended charge is untimely under §205.6(b) of the Rules. Under our 
Rules, the timeframe for filing of improper practice charges, including those objecting to 
the arbitrability of a proposal, are strictly construed.12 
The original and first amended charge raise a timely scope issue as to whether the 
hearing procedure contained in §11 of the Association's comprehensive GML §207-c 
proposal is a mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act. In contrast, the second 
amended charge, filed well after the Joint Employer filed its response to the petition for 
arbitration, asserts a new and distinct statutory claim under the Act: whether "the 207 
procedure" is not directly related to compensation, and, therefore nonarbitrable under 
§209.'4(g) of the Act. 
Based upon our conclusion that the Joint Employer's arbitrability claim does not 
relate back to its scope claim, we grant the Association's exception, reverse the ALJ, 
and dismiss the second amended charge as untimely.13 
Even if we were to find the second amended charge timely, we would deny the 
Joint Employer's argument that the ALJ misconstrued its second amended charge, 
which purportedly set forth a claim that the Association's entire GML §207-c proposal is 
nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. • , 
Contrary to the Joint Employer's argument, the supplemental pleading cannot 
12
 Fulton Firefighters Assn, Local 3063, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 29 PERB 1J6501 (1996); Elmira 
PBA 25 PERB 1J3072 (1992). 
13
 State of New York (Dept of Transportation), supra, note 11; Oyster Bay-East Norwich 
CentSch Dist, 23 PERB 1J3031 (1990), supra, note 11; City of Buffalo, 15 PERB 1J3027 
(1982). 
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reasonably be construed as asserting a claim of nonarbitrability with respect to the 
Association's entire GML §207-c proposal. Read in the context of the allegations of its 
original charge and first amended charge, the Joint Employer's supplemental pleading 
sought to add a new nonarbitrability claim limited to the proposed hearing procedure in 
§11 of the Association's GML §207-c proposal. In fact, the second amended charge 
repeats word for word the allegations from the earlier pleadings challenging the 
negotiability of the proposed hearing procedure, and then adds an additional paragraph 
claiming that the hearing procedure is nonarbitrable. 
Finally, we deny the Joint Employer's claim that it may challenge the arbitrability 
of the Association's entire GML §207-c proposal whether or not it filed a timely charge. 
Under our Rules, a party objecting to the arbitrability of a proposal is obligated to file a 
timely charge under §205.6(b) of the Rules. By failing to file a timely charge, the Joint 
Employer has waived any right to claim under §209-a.2(b) of the Act that the 
Association's GML §207-c proposal is nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
Although only proposals directly related to compensation are subject to compulsory 
interest arbitration under §209.4(g) of the Act, the Legislature did not place a similar 
limitation regarding voluntary interest arbitration involving organized units of deputy 
sheriffs under §209.2 of the Act. Based upon the fact that the Joint Employer has . 
waived any objection to the arbitrability of the GML §207-c proposal under §209-a.2(b) 
of the Act, we do not have to determine whether the proposal, in whole or in part, is 
directly related to compensation under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
Negotiability of the GML §207-c Hearing Procedure 
Although the ALJ did not reach the Joint Employer's claim that the hearing 
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procedure in §11 of the GML §207-c proposal is nonmandatory under the Act, the 
Association urges the Board to do so if we determine that the charge and the first 
amendment are timely.14 In response, the Joint Employer does not object to the 
Association's request and it has briefed the issue of negotiability, as well.15 In light of 
our conclusion that the initial charge and the first amended charge are timely, and the 
fact that the negotiability issue has been fully briefed by the parties, we have chosen to 
determine the issue without a remand to the ALJ. 
In its brief, the Joint Employer contends that the proposed GML §207-c hearing 
procedure is nonmandatory under Poughkeepsie Professional Firefighters' Association, 
Local 596, IAFF v New York State Public Employment Relations Board™ (Poughkeepsie). 
We disagree. 
In City of Watertown v New York State Public Employment Relations Board^7 
(Watertown), a divided Court of Appeals upheld our decision finding the following proposed 
general arbitration clause concerning GML §207-c was mandatory under the Act: 
Article 14, Section 12—Miscellaneous Provision—the PBA is 
not seeking to divest any (purported statutory) right the City 
may have under § 207(c) to initially determine whether the 
officer was either injured in the line of duty or taken sick as a 
result of the performance of duty, but rather, the PBA seeks 
14
 Brief in Support of Exceptions, pp. 20-25. 
15
 Memorandum of Law in Support of Answer, pp.1, 17-21. 
16
 36 PERB U3014 (2003), annulled sub nom., Poughkeepsie Prof Firefighters' Assn, 
Local 596, IAFF v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 36 PERB 1J7016 (Supreme Court 
Albany County 2003), revd, 16 AD3d 797, 38 PERB 1(7005 (3d Dept 2005) affd, 6 NY3d 
514, 39 PERB 1J7005 (2006). 
17
 30 PERB P072 (1997), confirmed, City of Watertown v New York State Pub Empl 
RelBd, 31 PERB 1J7013 (Supreme Court Albany County 1998), revd, 263 AD2d 797, 32 
PERB 1J7016 (3d Dept 1999) revd, 95 NY2d 73, 33 PERB U7007 (2000). 
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to negotiate the forum—and procedures associated 
therewith—through which disputes related to such 
determinations are processed, to wit: should the officer 
disagree with the City's conclusion, the PBA proposes the 
expeditious processing of all disputes related thereto to final 
and binding arbitration pursuant to PERB's Voluntary 
Disputes Resolution Procedure. 
In Poughkeepsie, however, a unanimous Court affirmed the confirmation of our 
decision finding that a much more detailed GML §207-a arbitration procedure in that 
case was nonmandatory based upon our interpretation that the proposal sought to give 
an arbitrator the ultimate authority for determining a statutory claim of entitlement to 
GML §207-a statutory benefits, rather than limiting the arbitrator's binding power to 
reviewing the employer's determination. 
In the present case, we conclude that the proposed GML §207-c hearing 
procedure in §11 is mandatory under Watertown™ Unlike Poughkeepsie, the proposed 
hearing procedure does not expressly or implicitly call for a de novo review of the Joint 
Employer's determination of a claim for statutory benefits subject to limited judicial 
review under CPLR Article 75. Instead, it proposes a hearing before a hearing officer 
resulting in a binding decision with the ultimate authority for resolving the dispute resting 
with the courts under CPLR Article 78.19 In interpreting the proposal, we rely upon other 
18
 See also, City of Middletown, 42 PERB TJ3022 (2009) (subsequent history omitted) 
(finding a proposed GML §207-c arbitration procedure to be mandatory under both 
Watertown and Poughkeepsie). 
19
 See generally, Ridge Road Fire Dist v Schiano, 16 NY3d 494, 44 PERB 1J7507 (2011) 
(a divided Court of Appeals held that the particular provisions of a collective bargaining 
agreement [agreement] mandated that a GML §207-a hearing officer under the 
agreement defer to the employer's denial of statutory benefits to a firefighter if the 
employer's determination was supported by substantial evidence and that the firefighter 
bore the burden of demonstrating that the employer's denial determination was not ; 
supported by substantial evidence.) 
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provisions of the Association's GML §207-c proposal that expressly recognize the Joint 
Employer's statutory rights and authority including the right to render an initial 
determination. 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ's decision, and dismiss the Joint 
Employer's charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge is hereby dismissed. 
DATED: August 19, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefk/witz, Chairperson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
Joint Exhibit 1 ,HH4, 6, 7, 9 and 10. 
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counsel), for County of Tompkins and Tompkins County Sheriff 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Tompkins County Deputy Sheriff's 
Association, Inc. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by the Tompkins County 
Deputy Sheriffs Association, Inc. (Association) and cross-exceptions by the County of 
Tompkins and the Tompkins County Sheriff (Joint Employer) to a decision of an 
Case Nos. U-28437 & U-28483 - 2 -
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1 In Case No. U-28437, the Joint Employer's amended 
charge alleges that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it sought interest arbitration of certain proposals that are 
nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. In Case No. U-28483, the Association's 
amended charge alleges that the Joint Employer violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it 
sought interest arbitration of a prohibited subject of negotiations. 
On a stipulated record, the ALJ concluded in Case No. U-28437 that the 
Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by submitting the following demands to 
interest arbitration because they are nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act: 
Association proposal 2-Article 3, §12 (Road Patrol) and §15 (Mandatory On-Call); 
Association proposal 4-Article 8, §5 (Health Insurance Buy-Out); Association proposal 
5-Article 9 (Road Patrol Schedule); Association proposal 8-Article 16 (General Municipal 
Law §207-c Procedure); Association proposal 9-Article 21 (Clothing Allowance), 1st 
paragraph, 3rd and 4th sentences and 3rd paragraph, last sentence; and Association 
proposal 10-Article 28 (Reciprocal Rights). 
In Case No. U-28483, however, the ALJ dismissed the Association's charge 
concluding that Joint Employer proposal-16 (Retroactivity) is not a prohibited subject of 
negotiations and was arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act because it is directly related 
to compensation under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association asserts in its exceptions that Joint Employer proposal-16 
(Retroactivity) is a prohibited subject of negotiations, and therefore the ALJ erred in 
1
 44 PERB H4517 (2011). 
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concluding that it is arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. The Association also 
contends that the ALJ erred in finding that certain of its proposals or portions of other 
proposals are nonarbitrable. The Joint Employer supports the ALJ's conclusion to the 
extent that he found the Association's proposals or portions thereof to be nonarbitrable. 
In its cross-exceptions, however, the Joint Employer asserts that the ALJ erred in 
finding that other aspects of the Association's proposals are arbitrable. 
Following a careful review of the record, the exceptions and cross-exceptions, we 
affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The collectively negotiated agreement between the Association and the Joint 
Employer expired on February 28, 2004. In September 2006, an interest arbitration 
panel issued an opinion and award resolving an impasse for the period of March 1, 
2004 through February 28, 2006. 
After negotiations for a successor agreement failed, the Association filed a 
petition for compulsory interest arbitration. The Joint Employer filed a response to the 
petition and an improper practice charge, Case No. U-28437, alleging that the 
Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by submitting various proposals to interest 
arbitration that are not directly related to compensation. In addition, the Association 
filed an improper practice charge, Case No. U-28483, which alleges that the Joint 
Employer violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it submitted certain of its demands to 
interest arbitration. The charges were consolidated by the ALJ and determined based 
upon a stipulated record in lieu of a hearing. , 
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DISCUSSION 
The Association's Exceptions 
We begin with the Association's claim that Joint Employer proposal-16 
(Retroactivity) is a prohibited subject of negotiations and, therefore, nonarbitrable under 
the Act because the proposal seeks to exclude all unit employees not on the payroll at 
the time of contract ratification and/or the date of an interest arbitration award from 
receiving retroactive payments of wages and benefits. 
A demand regarding retroactivity of wages and benefits is generally a mandatory 
subject of negotiations under the Act2 and arbitrable under §204.9(g) of the Act.3 
Nevertheless, the Association contends that the rationale in Baker v Board of 
Education, Hoosick Falls Central School District4 (Hoosick Falls) supports its argument 
that a demand for retroactive payments to only current employees is a prohibited 
subject of negotiations under the Act. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the AU's 
dismissal of the Association's amended charge.5 
In Hoosick Falls, the Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed a lower court 
decision denying motions to dismiss a complaint for declaratory relief filed by a group of 
retired employees alleging that an employee organization breached its duty of fair 
2
 See, Uniformed Fire Fighters Assn, Mount Vernon, Local 107, IAFF, 11 PERB1J3095 
(1978). ' 
3
 See, Putnam County Sheriff's Dept PBA, Inc., 38 PERB 1J3031 (2005). 
4
 194 Misc2d 116, 35 PERB 1J7501 (Rensselaer County Supreme Court 2002), affd, 3 
AD3d 678, 37 PERB 1J7502 (3d Dept 2004). 
5
 We note that the same argument has been rejected by other ALJs as well. See, 
Village of Montgomery PBA, Inc, 43 PERB ^4603 (2010); Madison County Deputy 
Sheriffs PBA, Inc., 44 PERB 1J4511 (2011) (exceptions pending). 
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representation when it: 1) entered into an agreement with the employer excluding the 
plaintiffs, but not current employees, from negotiated retroactive salary increases under . 
a new collectively negotiated agreement for the period that the plaintiffs had worked 
during the term of that new agreement; and 2) refused to process grievances on behalf 
of the plaintiffs with respect to their entitlement to retroactive salary increases. 
In affirming the lower court, the Appellate Division concluded, inter alia, that the 
employee organization had a duty to represent the plaintiffs because of the nexus between 
their former employment and the issue of retroactivity under the new agreement. In 
addition, the Appellate Division ruled that the complaint stated a cause of action for a 
breach of the duty of fair representation because it alleged that the employee organization 
did not provide any representation to the plaintiffs over the issue of retroactivity during the 
negotiations. Notably, the court distinguished the particular allegations of arbitrariness and 
bad faith made in the plaintiffs' complaint with the Court of Appeals decision in Civil Service 
Bar Association, Local 237, IBTv City of New Yorlf (Civil Service Bar Association). 
In Civil Service Bar Association, the Court of Appeals found that a bargaining agent 
did not breach its duty of fair representation when it made a good faith differentiation 
between classes of employees in a negotiated settlement with an employer with respect to 
benefits. Under the negotiated settlement in that case, employees who resigned prior to 
ratification of the agreement were excluded from receiving a negotiated lump sum payment 
being made to current employees. In affirming the merits-based dismissal of the duty of fair 
representation claim in Civil Service Bar Association, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Where the union undertakes a good-faith balancing of the 
6
 64 NY2d 188, 18 PERB 1J7502 (1984). 
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divergent interests of its membership and chooses to forego 
benefits which may be gained for one class of employees in 
exchange for benefits to other employees, such 
accommodation does not, of necessity, violate the union's 
duty of fair representation.7 
As the Association concedes in its brief, the Board has also long held that an 
agreement granting retroactive salary increases or other benefits to current employees, 
to the exclusion of former employees in the unit, does not constitute a violation of the 
duty of fair representation so long as the employee organization acted in good faith.8 
Contrary to the Association's argument, the rationale in Hoosick Falls for 
affirming the denial of the motions to dismiss in that plenary action does not constitute 
an expression of a New York public policy that outweighs New York's strong and 
sweeping policy supporting collective negotiations under the Act.9 Indeed, Hoosick 
Falls applied preexisting duty of fair representation standards when it concluded that the 
particular factual allegations made in plaintiffs' complaint stated a cause of action.10 In 
making its procedural determination, the court was obligated to grant all reasonable 
inferences to the factual allegations of bad faith and arbitrariness in the complaint 
7
 Supra, note 6, 64 NY2d at 197, 18 PERB 1J7502 at 7512. See also, Calkins vAssn of 
New York State Troopers, Inc., 21 Misc3d 1119(A), 2007 NYSlip Op 52569(U) 
(Supreme Court Ontario County 2007), affd, 55 AD3d 1328, 41 PERB 1J7517 (4th Dept 
2008), Iv denied, 11 NY3d 714 (2009). 
8
 See, Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent Sch Dist and Local 237, Int'l Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, 7 PERB1J3058 (1974); County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff and 
Teamsters Local 264 (Penna) 27 PERB P081 (1994); County of Dutchess and 
Dutchess County Deputy Sheriffs' PBA, Inc. (Heady), 31 PERB1J3068 (1998) 
(subsequent history omitted). 
9
 See, Cohoes City Sch Dist v Cohoes Teachers Assn, 40 NY2d 774, 9 PERB 1J7529 
(1976); Bd ofEduc of City Sch Dist of City of New York v New York State Pub EmpI Rel 
Bd, 75 NY2d 660, 23 PERB 1J7013 (1990); Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn of the City of 
New York, Inc v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 6 NY3d 563, 39 PERB 1J7006 (2006). 
10
 Smith v Sipe, 67 NY2d 928 (1986). 
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against the employee organization without regard to whether the plaintiffs would be able 
to ultimately prove those allegations.11 
In contrast, a court will not grant inferences to a complaint's allegations when 
determining the merits of a duty of fair representation cause of action. For example, at 
the summary judgment stage of litigation, a court will dismiss a duty of fair representation 
cause of action if the defendant employee organization presents sufficient undisputed 
facts demonstrating that it engaged in a good faith balance of the different unit members' 
interests as required under Civil Service Bar Association.^2 
Therefore, Hoosick Falls does not stand for the substantive proposition that an 
employer or an employee organization is prohibited from proposing the exclusion of one 
group of employees from a negotiated retroactive salary increase or other benefits.13 Nor 
does the decision establish a perse prohibition against such a proposal being considered 
by an interest arbitration panel pursuant to §204.4 of the Act or limit the ability of a party to 
advocate before the panel that such a proposal is inequitable or otherwise inappropriate, 
and therefore should not be included in the panel's opinion and award. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions with respect to 
Joint Employer proposal-16 (Retroactivity) and affirm the dismissal of Case No. U-28483. 
Next, we turn to the Association's exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusion 
that certain of its proposals are nonarbitrable pursuant to §209.4(g) of the Act. 
11
 See, 219 Broadway Corp v Alexander's, Inc., 46 NY2d 506 (1979). 
12
 Calkins vAssn of New York State Troopers, Inc., supra,, note 7, 
13
 See also, Anastacio v County of Putnam, 41 PERB1J7519 (Supreme Court Putnam 
County 2008). 
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Section 209.4(g) of the Act states, in relevant part: 
With regard to any organized unit of deputy sheriffs...the 
provisions of this section shall only apply to the terms of 
collective bargaining agreements directly relating to 
compensation, including, but not limited to, salary, stipends, 
location pay, insurance, medical and hospitalization benefits; 
and shall not apply to non-compensatory issues including, 
but not limited to, job security, disciplinary procedures and 
actions, deployment or scheduling, or issues relating to 
eligibility for overtime compensation which shall be governed 
by other provisions proscribed14 [sic] by law.. 
As we reiterated today in Orange County Deputy Sheriffs Police Benevolent 
Association, /nc15 (County of Orange), in deciding whether a particular proposal is 
directly related to compensation, and therefore arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act, we 
will examine the proposal to determine whether its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic is a modification in the amount or level of compensation under the test 
first articulated in New York State Police Investigators Association™ (State Police): 
The degree of a demand's relationship to compensation is 
measured by the characteristic of the demand. If the sole, 
predominant or primary characteristic of the demand is 
compensation, then it is arbitrable because the demand to 
that extent directly relates to compensation. A demand has 
compensation as its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic only when it seeks to effect some change in 
amount or level of compensation by either payment from the 
State to or on behalf of an employee or the modification of 
an employee's financial obligation arising from the 
employment relationship (e.g., a change in an insurance co-
payment).17 [Emphasis in original.] 
14
 Should be "prescribed". 
15
 44 PERBJ30_ (2011). 
16
 30 PERB 1J3013 (1997), confirmed sub nom., New York State Police Investigators 
Assn v New York State Pub EmpI RelBd, 30 PERB 1J7011 (Supreme Court Albany 
County 1997). 
17
 Supra, note 16, 30 PERB P013 at 3028. 
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We found in County of Orange, however, that when a unitary demand includes 
an inseparable nonarbitrable component under §209.4(g) of the Act, it cannot be 
reasonably interpreted to be solely, predominantly or primarily related to increasing the 
level or amount of compensation. Therefore, we reaffirmed the conclusion in Sullivan 
County Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, ./nc.18 (County of Sullivan) that a unitary 
demand that includes both nonarbitrable and arbitrable subjects does not satisfy the 
applicable arbitrability test under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
The application of the unitary demand principle to arbitrability disputes under 
§209.4(g) of the Act is necessitated by the Legislature's public policy, choice of dividing 
the subject matter of proposals for deputy sheriffs into two classes with distinct impasse 
procedures. An employer or an employee organization cannot avoid the statute's clear 
public policy by inextricably combining in a single proposal, a nonarbitrable subject with 
a subject that is directly related to compensation.19 As a practical matter, a party that 
1B
 39 PERB H3034 (2006). 
19
 We have applied the unitary demand doctrine for decades with respect to a proposal 
containing mandatory and nonmandatory subjects. Town of Haverstraw, 11 PERB 
1J3109 (1978) (subsequent history omitted); Pearl River Union Free Sch Dist, 11 PERB 
1J3085 (1978); City of Rochester, 12 PERBH3010 (1979); City of Oneida PBA, 15 PERB 
1J3096 (1982); Highland Falls PBA, lnc,42 PERB 1J3020 (2009). Under,this precedent, a 
party presenting a single demand containing both mandatory and nonmandatory 
subjects must reasonably indicate to the other party a willingness to negotiate the 
mandatory subjects separately. Such intent can be demonstrated on the basis of the 
wording of the proposal and/or the manner that it is presented at negotiations. To the 
extent that Town ofFishkill, 39 PERB H3035 (2006), can be construed as articulating a 
different test for determining whether a demand is unitary, it is hereby reversed. Finally, 
we reject the Association's argument that the unitary demand doctrine.should be 
abandoned. Contrary to the Association's claim, the doctrine enhances negotiations by 
requiring a party to communicate its intent regarding a multifaceted proposal and, when 
necessary, amending such a proposal to sever the mandatory from the nonmandatory. 
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chooses such a tactic assumes the high risk-of having its unitary proposal treated as 
nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act as well as causing inevitable delay in the 
ultimate resolution of the impasse. 
In the present case, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that Association Proposal 2-
Article 3, §15 (Mandatory On-Call), and Association Proposal 8-Article 16 (General 
Municipal Law §207-c Procedure) are nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. While 
compensation is a component of each, these unitary proposals are not "wage payment 
procedures" nor are they "purely compensatory in nature" as claimed by the Association.20 
Each unitary proposal addresses subjects that are not directly related to compensation, 
and, is therefore nonarbitrable. Association Proposal 2-Article 3, §15 (Mandatory On-Call) 
includes the timing and posting of on-call assignments and the distribution of an on-call 
schedule, both of which are not directly related to compensation.21 Similarly, components of 
Association Proposal 8-Article 16 (General Municipal Law §207-c Procedure) address 
nonarbitrable subjects under §209.4(g) of the Act such as the content of the medical 
information release form. The content of the particular form, unlike other components of 
the proposal, is not directly related to whether a unit member is eligible to receive, or to 
continue to receive, monetary benefits pursuant to GML §207-c. 
We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to Association Proposal 
20
 Association's Brief in Support of Exceptions, pp. 9-10. 
21
 The ALJ correctly identified other nonarbitrable aspects of this proposal, which we 
need not repeat. Supra, note 1, 44 PERB1J4517 at 4545. Following our review of the 
proposal, we also reject the Association's argument that the ALJ erred in finding the 
proposal unitary. There is nothing in the Association's proposal or set of proposals that 
reasonably indicate the Association's willingness to treat the various components of the 
proposal separately. 
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4-Article 8, §5 (Health Insurance Buy-Out). The primary and predominant characteristic 
of this proposal is to increase the level of compensation for unit employees based upon 
declination and waiver of employer health insurance coverage, and the conversion of 
that benefit into compensation. Following a declination and waiver, the employee is 
eligible to receive additional compensation under a formula set forth in the proposal. In 
addition, the proposal would allow an employee to terminate receipt of the additional 
compensation through a request to re-establish health care coverage. While there are 
components of the proposal that are procedural in nature, those procedures directly 
relate to whether a unit employee is eligible for an increase or decrease in the level of 
compensation. Therefore, we reverse the ALJ's conclusion that this proposal is 
nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
In County of Orange,22 we reaffirmed the holding in State Police23 that proposals 
limited to seeking an increase in the amount of accumulated leave without a wage 
reduction are not directly related to compensation. In the present case, the ALJ 
correctly found Association proposal 10-Article 28 (Reciprocal Rights) to be a demand 
seeking leave from work for Association activities without a loss in pay, and therefore it 
is nonarbitrable under State Police. 
We also affirm the ALJ's finding that Association proposal 2-Article 3, §12 
(Road Patrol) and Association proposal 5-Article 9 (Road Patrol Schedule) are 
nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
The parties stipulated that the alternating biweekly schedule in Association 
Supra, note 15. 
Supra, note 16. 
Case Nos. U-28437 & U-28483 - 1 2 -
proposal 2-Article 3, §12 (Road Patrol) would result in unit employees working 1944 
hours per year or 243 days per year. In its brief, the Association argues that the 
immediate consequence of this proposal is a shortened work year and a lower number 
of mandatory hours of work thereby increasing the hourly rate of pay for unit employees. 
We reject the Association's argument on three grounds. First, we are unable to 
conclude that the proposal would shorten the days and hours worked because the 
record is silent with respect to the annual number of days or hours currently worked. In 
addition, the Association's unit members are not paid on an hourly basis, and therefore, 
under State Police the proposal is nonarbitrable because it would result in additional 
time off for unit employees without a cumulative increase in compensation. Finally, the 
proposal, like Association proposal 5-Article 9 (Road Patrol Schedule), is primarily 
related to scheduling, a subject that the Legislature chose to expressly define as 
nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. 
Finally, the Association asserts in its exceptions that the ALJ erred by holding 
that the fourth sentence of the first paragraph in Association proposal 9-Article 21 
(Clothing Allowance) is nonmandatory and, therefore, nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of 
the Act. As the Association correctly points out, the Joint Employer's amended charge 
alleges only that the proposal is not directly related to compensation; the pleading does 
not allege that the demand was nonmandatory. Nevertheless, we affirm the ALJ finding 
that the sentence is nonarbitrable because its primary and predominant characteristic is 
equipment, a subject that is not compensatory in nature. 
Joint Employer's Cross-Exceptions 
In its cross-exceptions, the Joint Employer challenges the ALJ's findings that the 
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separate demands in Association proposal 2-Article 3, §§2 and 5 are arbitrable under 
§209.4(g) of the Act. Contrary to the Joint Employer's arguments, we find each to be 
directly related to compensation. The first proposes modification of the current 
agreement by mandating, rather than permitting, the Joint Employer to pay the working 
rate of pay to a deputy sheriff who is hired with at least one year of prior experience. 
We reject the Joint Employer's assertion that the predominant characteristic of this 
demand is to restrain managerial discretion with respect to hiring. The second demand 
would amend the current agreement by requiring that deputy sheriffs be paid overtime 
compensation for all travel time to and from training, including study time and notebook 
preparation. While the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193824 (FLSA) may arguably treat 
such periods as noncompensable,25 it is well-settled that the FLSA sets the floor but not 
the ceiling regarding compensation. Therefore, the FLSA has no relevancy to this 
particular Association demand, which would increase the aggregate level of 
compensation for Association unit members, and therefore, is arbitrable under 
§209.4(g)oftheAct. 
Finally, we grant, in part, the Joint Employer's cross-exception challenging the 
ALJ's conclusion that Association proposal 9-Article 21 (Clothing Allowance) is not a 
unitary demand. Based upon the proposal's structure and wording, we conclude that it 
includes three distinct and severable unitary demands. The first and third paragraphs 
24
 29 USC §201, etseq. 
25
 29 CFR §553.226(b)(3)(c) states: "Police officers or employees in fire protection 
activities, who are in attendance at a police or fire academy or other training facility, are 
not considered to be on duty during those times when they are not in class or at a 
training session, if they are free to use such time for personal pursuits. Such free time is 
not compensable." 
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are nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act because they include arbitrable and 
nonarbitrable subjects. The second paragraph, however, is arbitrable because its sole 
characteristic is an increase in compensation. 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of 
the Act when it submitted the following proposals to compulsory interest arbitration: 
Association proposal 2-Article 3, §12 (Road Patrol) and §15 (Mandatory On-Call); 
Association proposal 5-Article 9 (Road Patrol Schedule); Association proposal 8-Article 
16 (General Municipal Law §207-c Procedure); Association proposal 9-Article 21 
(Clothing Allowance), 1st and 3rd paragraphs; and Association proposal 10-Article 28 
(Reciprocal Rights). 
In light of our finding that Joint Employer proposal 16 (Retroactivity) is arbitrable, 
we dismissed Case No. U-28483 in its entirety. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Case No. U-28483 is dismissed and that 
the Association withdraw the above-listed proposals from interest arbitration. 
DATED: August 19, 2011 
Albany, New York 
(/'/A^h^L. 
Jerome Lefkowjfz, Chairpe/son 
9 2k^s*/g-
-'"" Sheila S.-Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 2028, 
Petitioner, CASE NO. CP-1287 
- and -
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
WILLIAM E. GRANDE, ESQ., for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the International Longshoremen's 
Association, Local 2028 (Local 2028) to a decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing its petition for the 
placement of the position of Safety Specialist employed by the Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority (NFTA) into its existing negotiating unit.1 
In his decision, the Director ruled that: 
A petition for unit placement cannot be used to decertify a 
bargaining agent with respect to certain titles by fragmenting 
them from an existing unit. While such petitions may be 
used under limited circumstances to contest the employer's > 
placement of a title into an existing negotiating unit shortly 
after such placement, such circumstances do not here exist.2 
(citations omitted) 
Local 2028 argues in support of its exceptions that the Board has never 
1
 44 PERB 1J4003 (2011). 
2
 Supra, note 1, 44 PERB 1J4003 at 4009. 
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decisively confirmed the proposition stated in the first sentence of the above-quoted 
ruling, and it urges us to repudiate it. Although we have not previously addressed this 
proposition definitively, our decision in Ogdensburg City School Districf states that "the 
intent [of our Rules of Procedure] was only to allow for the placement into the 
appropriate unit of... positions which had been excluded ... from representation."4 In 
any event, we now affirm the Director's ruling and hold that a unit placement petition is 
not a proper procedural vehicle for seeking to remove a position from an existing unit 
except under very limited circumstances. 
Local 2028 filed its unit placement petition to remove the at-issue position of 
Safety Specialist from a unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) and to place the position in the unit it 
represents. Local 2028's petition was filed approximately 11 months after the position 
was placed in the CSEA unit pursuant to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) granting a unit placement petition filed by CSEA.5 
Local 2028 contends that its unit placement petition should have been processed 
by the Director because CSEA's earlier representation petition had been processed to 
completion without its knowledge and participation. 
The record reveals that Local 2028 was not referenced by CSEA or NFTA in their 
respective pleadings during the processing of CSEA's earlier petition before the ALJ. 
3
 31 PERB H3060(1998). 
4
 Supra, note 3, 31 PERB J3060 at 3131. 
5
 Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth, 43 PERB ^4003 (2010). CSEA had filed a 
similar petition seeking, inter alia, to place the same position into its unit but withdrew 
that request under the terms of a stipulation with NFTA. See, Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Auth, 38 PERB j[4021 (2005); Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth, 43 
PERB H4003(2010). 
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As a result, Local 2028 was never notified of the pendency of the petition. NFTA's 
opposition to CSEA's petition centered upon its arguments that the duties of the position 
warranted a managerial/confidential designation, and that CSEA waived the right to 
seek placement based upon the terms of a prior stipulation between the parties. Those 
were the issues presented by the parties and determined by the ALJ. 
Pursuant to §201.5(c)(6) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), a petitioner seeking 
.unit clarification or placement is obligated to set forth in its petition "the name and 
address of any other employee organization which claims to represent the position." In 
addition, §201.5(d) of the Rules requires a response to such a petition to set forth "a 
specific admission, denial or explanation of each allegation made by the petitioner... 
and a clear and concise statement of any other facts which the responding party claims 
may affect the processing or disposition of the petition." 
In the present case, Local 2028 does not allege that CSEA and/or NFTA were 
aware that Local 2028 claimed to represent the Safety Specialist position, which has 
existed for a number of years. Indeed, Local 2028 does not claim that it had been 
previously unaware of the existence of the position or allege facts that, if proven, would 
demonstrate it had previously claimed to represent or claimed the. right to represent the 
position. Therefore, we are not persuaded that Local 2028's petition fits within the very 
narrow circumstances where a unit placement petition may be utilized to remove a 
position from an existing unit. As a result, we affirm the Director's dismissal of the unit 
placement petition filed by Local 2028. 
Although this case does not present us with circumstances that warrant the 
processing of a unit placement petition for the removal of the title from the CSEA unit, 
we emphasize that a different set of alleged facts might have led us to a reach a 
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different conclusion. For example, in a case in which a unit placement was based upon 
an intentional failure of a party and/or parties to disclose the identity of another 
employee organization claiming to represent the at-issue position, or that may be 
affected by the petition, might warrant the processing of a unit placement petition to 
remove the position from one unit and place it in another.6 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the exceptions by Local 2028 and affirm the 
decision of the Director. 
DATED: August 19, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. ColeT Member 
6
 In addition, the deliberate failure to disclose the identity of the other employee 
organization may also constitute grounds for an improper practice charge under §§209-
a.1 (a) and 209-a.2(a) of the Act. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 106, 
TRANSIT SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-27583 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent, 
-and-
SUBWAY SURFACE SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
COLLERAN O'HARA & MILLS (MICHAEL B. BOSSO of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(ROBERT K. DRINAN of counsel), for Employer 
LAW OFFICES OF STUART SALLES, ESQ. (STUART SALLES of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions by the Transport Workers Union, 
Local 106, Transit Supervisors Organization (TSO) to a decision by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge alleging that the New York 
City Transit Authority (Authority) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by transferring unit work previously performed exclusively by 
- Office Managers, a title within TSO's unit, to Administrative Station Supervisors Level 1 
(ASSI), which are in a unit represented by the Subway Surface Supervisors Association 
Case No. U-27583 _2_ 
(SSSA).1 , 
Following our review of the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits herein, 
we affirm the findings of fact of the ALJ, and her conclusion that neither Office 
Managers nor any other TSO-represented employees ever performed the at-issue 
clerical and administrative duties exclusively. Rather, prior to the assignment of those 
duties to ASSIs, the duties were performed by Zone Superintendents, who are also not 
in the TSO represented unit. Inasmuch as TSO has not demonstrated that it 
exclusively performed the work, we deny its exceptions and affirm the decision of the 
ALJ.2 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its' entirety. 
DATED: August 19, 2011 
Albany, New York 
'jUWfrvCs' 
wife, Chairman Jerome Lefko Jtz i r 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
1
 43 PERB lf4505 (2010). At the commencement of the first day of hearing, SSSA 
appeared and placed a statement on the record. SSSA stated that it was satisfied that 
its position would be well-represented by the Authority but wanted to participate in any 
settlement discussions that may take place. SSSA then left the hearing and did not 
participate in subsequent hearings. 
2
 See, Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth, 18 PERB 1J3083 (1985); Manhasset Union 
Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB 1J3005 (2008), confirmed and mod, in part, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 
PERB H7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittitur, 42 PERB 1J3016 (2009). 
